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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is an appeal from the bankruptcy court's award, 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330 (1988),1 of over $3.1 million in fees 
and expenses for accounting services Zolfo, Cooper & Company 
provided during Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings to the 
debtors, Allegheny International, Incorporated, its affiliates, 
and subsidiaries.  The debtors were predecessors in interest to 
appellee, Sunbeam-Oster Company.  Zolfo Cooper disputes the 
bankruptcy court's disallowance of fees totalling $249,957.87 and 
of expenses totalling $84,852.97.  The district court affirmed 
the bankruptcy court, and this appeal followed.  We will affirm. 
 I. 
 On February 20, 1988, the debtors filed petitions for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  On July 12, 
1990, the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtors' disclosure 
statement and plan for reorganization, and in September 1990 the 
plan was consummated.  As a result, Sunbeam-Oster Company 
acquired all the assets and liabilities of the debtors. 
 At the outset of the bankruptcy process the debtors 
filed motions for authorization to employ financial and 
                     
1
.  In 1994, Congress made revisions to § 330(a) which apply to 
cases commenced after October 22, 1994.  See Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, §§ 224, 702, 108 Stat. 4106, 
4130, 4150 (1994). 
  
bankruptcy advisors.  The bankruptcy court authorized Zolfo 
Cooper's employment on February 20, 1988.  Zolfo Cooper was one 
of seventeen legal, financial, and accounting firms, each of 
which submitted monthly fee applications to the bankruptcy court 
for review and approval during the bankruptcy proceedings.  
 On December 14, 1989, the bankruptcy court issued the 
first of many opinions regarding fee applications, in this case a 
decision on the fee requests of four law firms.  In its opinion, 
the bankruptcy court stated, "With certain exceptions, we find 
the hourly rates requested to be too high.  They depart from the 
cost of comparable services in Western Pennsylvania."  In re 
Allegheny Int'l, Inc., No. 88-448, slip op. at 4 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 14, 1989) ("December 14, 1989, Opinion").  The court noted 
its dismay over the behavior of the lawyers who "reinvented the 
wheel several times" and were parties to "greed and personality 
clashes . . . ."  Id. at 5.   
 The court turned to consider the "hourly rates in our 
local bankruptcy court marketplace."  Id. (quoting In re Shaffer-
Gordon Assocs., Inc., 68 B.R. 344, 350 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986)).  
It determined "our experience tells us that the market rate in 
Western Pennsylvania for bankruptcy counsel of high caliber is 
$150 per hour.  We routinely observe quality bankruptcy work 
billed at that rate in chapter 11 cases by partners, and lesser 
amounts by associates."  Id. at 5-6.   
 The bankruptcy court then stated it recognized the 
difficulty, complexity, and size of this particular case, and 
announced it would therefore "allow rates higher than the 
  
aforementioned market rates, as listed below in our discussion of 
the appropriate rates for each of the four law firms."  Id. at 6.  
The court added the caveat that the maximum rate was not 
unvaryingly warranted as the case also contained many routine 
matters.  It explained lower rates were proper due to lack of 
success and because payment was guaranteed.  It reasoned that 
bankruptcy practice is national in scope for large cases such as 
this one, but that the New York City rates the law firms 
requested would not alone set the national standard. 
 In orders and memorandum opinions dated August 21, 
1990, and December 20, 1990, the bankruptcy court addressed Zolfo 
Cooper's applications for interim compensation for the periods 
February 20, 1988, to February 28, 1989, and March 1, 1989, to 
September 15, 1990, respectively.  On April 30, 1991, the 
bankruptcy court issued an order regarding Zolfo Cooper's 
application for compensation for services from September 16, 
1990, to December 31, 1990, for all previously disallowed fees 
and expenses, and for premium compensation in the amount of $1.1 
million.  The bankruptcy court denied this last application in 
its entirety. 
 In the bankruptcy court's memorandum opinion of August 
21, 1990, it incorporated by reference the December 14, 1989, 
opinion described above.  The court explained it was capping 
Zolfo Cooper's fees at an hourly rate of $225 per hour in part 
because "almost all of the work done by this applicant was done 
by highly paid personnel; there were virtually no lower paid 
personnel rendering services.  Moreover, the court is concerned 
  
that the services rendered by this applicant may overlap the 
services of the debtor's counsel, investment bankers, and 
accountants.  For these reasons, the court limits hourly rates to 
$225."  In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., No. 88-448, slip op. at 2 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1990) ("August 21, 1990, Opinion").  
The court also criticized Zolfo Cooper's fee petitions, which it 
asserted "contain numerous listings which are too vague or do not 
specify the parties involved or the subject matter of the service 
. . . .  For those listings, the court is unable to determine 
whether such services were actual and necessary services and 
whether the time allotted was reasonable."  Id. at 4.    
 Zolfo Cooper filed a motion for reconsideration and a 
request for clarification.  The bankruptcy court denied the 
motion for reconsideration on August 16, 1991, and expressly 
reaffirmed its earlier orders and opinions.  The August 16, 1991, 
order also incorporated by reference a separate memorandum 
opinion of the same date which stated, "The rates [we] found to 
be the costs of comparable services in non bankruptcy situations 
in Western Pennsylvania may not be the rates which are prevalent 
in other metropolitan areas or which may have become comparable 
nationally in large Chapter 11 cases."  In re Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc., No. 88-448, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1991) 
("August 16, 1991, Opinion").  The bankruptcy court then stated 
that Japonica Partners, who ultimately took control of the 
debtors through Sunbeam-Oster,2 had voluntarily paid higher rates 
                     
2
.  Japonica Partners held 99.6% of the stock of Sunbeam-Oster. 
  
to the professionals it hired.  The other professionals urged 
these rates upon the bankruptcy court as evidence of comparable 
market rates for their services.  The bankruptcy court noted, 
however, that Japonica Partners paid those rates during a hostile 
takeover, and that there were "important differences between the 
two processes and that the professional fees obtained in mergers 
and acquisition and hostile takeover activities are not 
comparable for Chapter 11 cases."  Id. at 6.3 
 Zolfo Cooper appealed the bankruptcy court's order of 
August 16, 1991, to the district court, which affirmed.  This 
appeal followed. 
 II. 
 In our review of the bankruptcy court's factual 
findings we, like the district court, review for clear error.  
Resyn Corp. v. United States, 851 F.2d 660, 664 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Our review of legal precepts is plenary.  Id. (quoting Universal 
Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 
1981)).  Since we are in as good a position to review the 
bankruptcy court's decision as the district court was, we will 
review the bankruptcy court's findings by the standards the 
district court would apply.  Universal Minerals, 669 F.2d at 102.  
Fee awards are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which can 
occur "if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or 
to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or bases 
                     
3
.  The bankruptcy court's final order pertaining to Zolfo Cooper 
was a clarifying order dated September 5, 1991, which expressly 
reaffirmed its earlier orders.   
  
an award upon findings of fact that are clearly erroneous."  
Electro-Wire Prods., Inc. v. Sirote & Permutt, P.C. (In re 
Prince), 40 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hatcher v. 
Miller (In re Red Carpet Corp.), 902 F.2d 883, 890 (11th Cir. 
1990)). 
 Jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court was proper under 
28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).  The district court had jurisdiction 
over the appeal from the final order of the bankruptcy court, id. 
§ 158(a), and we have jurisdiction over the appeal of the 
district court's judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 III. 
 A. 
 Zolfo Cooper contends the bankruptcy court erred in 
setting a cap on the rates charged by four law firms in its 
December 14, 1989, Opinion.  The bankruptcy court incorporated 
the December 14, 1989, Opinion in its August 21, 1990, Opinion, 
in setting a maximum rate on Zolfo Cooper's hourly fees.  Zolfo 
Cooper contends the bankruptcy court improperly ignored evidence 
of the hourly rate which Zolfo Cooper commands in the national 
market for its services.  Instead, Zolfo Cooper asserts, the 
bankruptcy court looked to the local market for professional 
services and applied its own notion of the proper hourly rate.   
 Zolfo Cooper asserts the bankruptcy court's fee 
decisions misapply the law, pointing out that the bankruptcy 
court acknowledged the Allegheny International bankruptcy was 
"national in scope."  December 14, 1989, Opinion at 11.  Zolfo 
Cooper argues this warranted compensation at higher rates than 
  
allowed, because "[professionals'] hourly rates are fixed by the 
market in which they customarily practice, not by the 
Court. . . .  In [unusually large cases], the Court is free to 
look to a national market in making fee allowances."  In re 
Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47 B.R. 557, 579 (Bankr. D. Utah 
1985). 
 The question of what fees should be awarded to 
professionals hired to assist with a bankruptcy or management of 
a bankrupt estate is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 330, which provides 
in part: 
 
  (a) After notice to any parties in 
interest and to the United States trustee and 
a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, 
and 329 of this title, the court may award to 
a trustee, to an examiner, to a professional 
person employed under section 327 or 1103 of 
this title, or to the debtor's attorney-- 
 
   (1) reasonable compensation 
for actual, necessary services 
rendered by such trustee, examiner, 
professional person, or attorney, 
as the case may be, and by any 
paraprofessional persons employed 
by such trustee, professional 
person, or attorney, as the case 
may be, based on the nature, the 
extent, and the value of such 
services, the time spent on such 
services, and the cost of 
comparable services other than in a 
case under this title; and 
 
   (2) reimbursement for actual, 
necessary expenses. 
 Recently we issued a comprehensive opinion interpreting 
this section.  In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., 19 F.3d 833 (3d 
  
Cir. 1994).  In Busy Beaver, we addressed whether certain 
paralegal expenses were compensable under § 330.  We held § 330's 
language, "the court may award" reasonable compensation, "imbues 
the court with discretionary authority," and that the bankruptcy 
court possesses both the power and the duty to review fee 
applications.  Id. at 841.  
 We recognized in Busy Beaver that § 330 presents a 
"market-driven approach," id. at 852, in which the cost of 
comparable services is the most important of the listed factors, 
the others being the nature, extent, and value of the services, 
id. at 849.  We stated, "We disapprove of any approach that 
allows a court confronted with undisputed, credible, contrary 
evidence of market practices in the record to rely solely on its 
own judgment . . . ."  Id. at 848. 
 On the other hand, we also noted that reliance on the 
market is tempered because "the court will, in practical terms, 
act as a surrogate for the estate, reviewing the fee application 
much as a sophisticated non-bankruptcy client would review a 
[professional] bill."  Id.  And we observed that "certainly a 
bankruptcy judge's experience with fee petitions and his or her 
expert judgment pertaining to appropriate billing practices, 
founded on an understanding of the legal profession, will be the 
starting point for any analysis."  Id. at 854.  
 In announcing the market-driven approach, Busy Beaver 
cited favorably to In re Patronek, 121 B.R. 728 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1990), which had relied on market information to set fees for 
purposes of § 330.  Busy Beaver, 19 F.3d at 854 n.31.  In In re 
  
Patronek, the court stated, "The proper measure of what fee is 
reasonable in any context is ascertainment of what an informed 
client and an informed attorney would agree should be paid for 
certain services.  If the marketplace naturally establishes a 
price for a service, then we believe that it is logical to assume 
that this is [the proper figure]."  121 B.R. at 731. 
 But in Busy Beaver we also added that where evidence 
proves a market rate that directly contradicts the court's 
judgment, the market rate must take precedence.  19 F.3d at 854.  
Significantly, however, we held the bankruptcy court may discount 
evidence presented by the fee applicant, since courts "are 
themselves experts on the value of services rendered in a 
bankruptcy proceeding and are not bound by the evidence offered."  
Id. (quoting York Int'l Bldg., Inc. v. Chaney (In re York Int'l 
Bldg., Inc.), 527 F.2d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 1975)).  We also 
stated, "[T]he court should to the extent practicable make 
findings of fact and provide reasoned explanations in the record 
to facilitate review."  Id. at 854. 
 Busy Beaver was decided after the bankruptcy 
proceedings were completed in this case, and therefore the 
bankruptcy court did not have the benefit of its guidance.  Yet 
Busy Beaver is controlling even though it was decided after the 
bankruptcy court's opinions.  See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486 n.16 (1981) (stating "[a]n appellate 
court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its 
decision" (citation omitted)); Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 
318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943) (noting "[a] change in the law between a 
  
nisi prius and an appellate decision requires the appellate court 
to apply the changed law"); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 
691, 695 (3d Cir. 1988) (observing "a controversy is to be 
decided on the law as it exists at the time the appellate court 
considers the case, although that law may differ from the one in 
force at the time the trial court decided the matter"), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989). 
 In its December 14, 1989, Opinion, the bankruptcy court 
looked to In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3d 
Cir. 1984), in which we had explained that "[t]he value of an 
attorney's time generally is reflected in his normal billing 
rate."  Id. at 583 (quoting Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 
(3d Cir. 1973)).  The bankruptcy court followed this standard.  
At the final hearing on fee applications, the bankruptcy court 
noted its strong reliance on the market for professional services 
in setting the fee allowances: "[W]e used . . . as best we could 
the actual fees being paid by the debtor for the previous two 
years with some minor modifications as to what they were paying 
the lawyers over that time period or something close to that, so 
as to somehow attempt to get a good picture of what the market 
was for a company of this size and for a company with these kinds 
of problems."  J. App. at 1019. 
 Zolfo Cooper argues that "in large bankruptcy cases, 
like Allegheny International, professionals with national 
practices should receive compensation at their normal hourly 
rates, even if that rate is much greater than the local rate."  
  
Appellant's Br. at 30-31.  Zolfo Cooper claims it therefore 
should have gotten the rates it requested. 
 While in Busy Beaver we cited approvingly to cases in 
which out-of-state firms appropriately received higher rates in 
difficult cases, we also observed that "the reasonable hourly 
rate has a cap based on the expected and actual complexity of the 
case, a cap which, while flexible, should stave off clear abuses 
[by fee applicants]."  19 F.3d at 856 n.35.  We noted that the 
court should review a fee application to "ensure the applicant 
exercises the same 'billing judgment' as do non-bankruptcy 
[professionals] . . . ."  Id. at 856.4 
 The bankruptcy court looked to the evidence of market 
rates before it and adjusted the rates according to its 
experience and the nature, extent, and value of the services.  
The court explained what the local bankruptcy rates were and why 
the professionals (including Zolfo Cooper) deserved higher rates 
                     
4
.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made this point 
in Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 
1993).  Observing that the lawyer's hourly rate is a starting 
point provided by the market for analysis of a reasonable fee, 
the court stated:  
 
 A judge who departs from this presumptive 
rate must have some reason other than the 
ability to identify a different average rate 
in the community.  A judge might say, for 
example, that the lawyers did not display the 
excellence, or achieve the time savings, 
implied by their higher rates.  A judge might 
conclude that the plaintiff did not need top-
flight counsel in a no-brainer case. 
 
Id. at 1151. 
  
than those local rates.  It also explained why the applicants did 
not deserve New York rates and why it was exercising its 
discretion to reduce the request.5 
 The baseline rule is for firms to receive their 
customary rates.  Zolfo Cooper cites to three record items which 
it claims established the rates it customarily charges: (1) its 
affidavit supplied as part of the debtors' motion to retain Zolfo 
Cooper and other professionals; (2) a retention letter from Zolfo 
Cooper to Allegheny International for services to be performed 
before the bankruptcy filing; and (3) evidence of rates paid by 
Sunbeam-Oster to professionals retained by it and Japonica 
Partners (which controls Sunbeam-Oster).  J. App. at 14, 32-35, 
692-735.  
                     
5
.  We explicitly countenanced this approach in Busy Beaver, 19 
F.3d at 856 n.35.  In Busy Beaver we cited favorably to In re 
Waldoff's, Inc., 132 B.R. 329, 335-36 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1991), 
and In re Casull, 139 B.R. 525, 528 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).  In 
each of those cases, the bankruptcy court refused to award the 
professional its higher out-of-town rates on the basis that the 
professional had failed to show those rates were justified.  
While in this opinion we focus upon the bankruptcy court's 
decisions, we note the proof submitted by Zolfo Cooper was not 
particularly strong. 
 
 In another appeal treating the fee decisions by the 
bankruptcy court in this case, Fulbright & Jaworski v. Sunbeam-
Oster Co. (In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 139 B.R. 336, 341 (W.D. 
Pa. 1992), the district court assessed how the bankruptcy court 
reached its conclusions, and found "that the bankruptcy court 
properly considered the fact that New York market rates are 
higher than those of western Pennsylvania, and adjusted 
[Fulbright & Jaworski's] fee award according to other significant 
factors."  Cf. In re Allegheny Int'l (Wells Fargo), 131 B.R. 24, 
31 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (finding the bankruptcy court's reduction of 
fees to New York law firm Paul Weiss erroneous because the sole 
basis for reduction was that Paul Weiss should be subject to the 
cap the court set in its December 14, 1989, opinion). 
  
 Given this evidence of what Zolfo Cooper typically 
charges, a reduction of those rates, without more, might have 
been error given our admonition in Busy Beaver that "[w]e 
disapprove of any approach that allows a court confronted with 
undisputed, credible, contrary evidence of market practices in 
the record to rely solely on its own judgment . . . ."  19 F.3d 
at 848.  But the bankruptcy court did not rely solely on its own 
judgment when it considered, and then reduced, Zolfo Cooper's 
rates, nor did Zolfo Cooper present much evidence of the fees it 
customarily charges. 
 Zolfo Cooper's evidence provides only a range of fees.  
The bankruptcy court found Zolfo Cooper was billing excessively 
in the high end of that range and capped the fees accordingly.  
See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 677 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(observing that "[r]outine tasks, if performed by senior partners 
in large firms, should not be billed at their usual rates.  A 
Michelangelo should not charge Sistine Chapel rates for painting 
a farmer's barn").  The court explained why it was capping the 
rates for Zolfo Cooper below the New York rates it requested, 
observing Zolfo Cooper had duplicated effort, used too many high-
level personnel, and submitted an incomplete fee application.6  
                     
6
.  While the bankruptcy court's opinions did not mention it as a 
basis for decision, we find it instructive to note that several 
of Zolfo Cooper's employees raised their hourly rates 
substantially during the course of the bankruptcy proceeding.  
The increases ranged from 20% to 76%.  Mr. LoBiondo charged the 
largest number of hours for Zolfo Cooper, and his rate increase 
was the sharpest, rising 76% over two years from $170 to $300.  
While the record does not provide information to enable us to 
compare these increases with the increases of other 
professionals, we do note that the associate at Fried, Frank, 
  
The court held there was a blend of complicated and simple 
matters relating to this particular proceeding, and that although 
the case was national in scope, there was no particular reason to 
assume the cost of comparable services should be the rates in New 
York City.  Zolfo Cooper bore the burden of proof to demonstrate 
its customary fees were warranted and did not carry it.  In re 
Metro Transp. Co., 107 B.R. 50, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
 We believe the bankruptcy court erred in taking the 
market rate for services in Western Pennsylvania as a starting 
point.  This is not the appropriate starting point for the 
determination of the market in which Zolfo Cooper practices.  The 
idea that a firm should be restricted to the hourly rate typical 
in the locale of the case "is unduly parochial particularly in 
this age of national and regional law firms working on larger 
more complex bankruptcy cases of more than local import."  In re 
Robertson Cos., 123 B.R. 616, 619 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1990).  The 
bankruptcy court here should have looked first to Zolfo Cooper's 
customary market (New York) and then made reductions based on the 
other factors.7  But this error does not require reversal because 
the bankruptcy court achieved substantially the same result.  
(..continued) 
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson who billed the majority of the firm's 
hours increased her rate from $160 to $180 per hour over the same 
period. 
7
.  The rates Zolfo Cooper requested ranged from $125 to $325 for 
its professional staff (before it raised those rates, see supra 
note 6).  The New York law firms requested rates ranging from $70 
to $335.  The bankruptcy court observed that appropriate rates in 
Western Pennsylvania were $150, but ultimately set the top 
billing rate at $225. 
  
While the bankruptcy court erroneously started with Western 
Pennsylvania as the baseline, it properly raised the hourly rates 
as close to the New York rates as it determined was warranted 
given its findings regarding Zolfo Cooper's improper billing.8  
On the facts of this case there is no substantive difference 
between the two approaches (i.e., the correct method of starting 
with New York rates and lowering them and the incorrect method of 
starting with local rates and raising them).  Thus, any potential 
error by the bankruptcy court did not affect Zolfo Cooper's right 
to compensation.  When substantial rights are not affected by an 
error, reversal is not appropriate.  McQueeney v. Wilmington 
Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 923-28 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 The bankruptcy court cut Zolfo Cooper's total 
compensation request approximately twelve percent.  When faced 
with a reduction of ten percent in a similar case, we stated that 
"[n]o court, viewing a record of this magnitude from the distance 
inherent in appellate review, could assess the reasonability of a 
reduction as slight as ten percent with flawless precision."  
                     
8
.  The bankruptcy court stated, "[I]t is for the Court to 
determine what a reasonable hourly rate for a certain task is, 
when such a determination is based on our constant exposure to 
the rates requested by other members of the local bankruptcy 
bar."  December 14, 1989, Opinion at 6 (citations and quotations 
omitted).  This language alone might suggest the bankruptcy court 
did not put sufficient emphasis on the market information that 
was available to it.  But the remainder of the bankruptcy court's 
opinions and other language in the opinion just quoted show that 
in fact the court was paying a great deal of attention to 
evidence of market rates.  We are satisfied the language quoted 
here was aberrational. 
  
Daggett v. Kimmelman, 811 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1987).  We 
conclude the reduction here was not an abuse of discretion. 
 B. 
 The bankruptcy court did not specifically rule on Zolfo 
Cooper's fee applications until its August 21, 1990, Opinion.  
This, Zolfo Cooper argues, created reversible error by ignoring 
the command in Busy Beaver that the decision whether to retain 
"nationally renowned [professional firms]," with their "lofty 
fees," should be made "as early as practical, preferably before 
the debtor retains the professional."  19 F.3d at 856 n.35.  
Zolfo Cooper had worked since February 1988, and contends it was 
unfairly prejudiced by the delay.  Zolfo Cooper also asserts 11 
U.S.C. § 328(a) (1988)9 applies and that the court could not 
change the terms of employment set forth in Zolfo Cooper's motion 
for retention without a finding under § 328(a) that the terms of 
Zolfo Cooper's retention had proved improvident. 
                     
9
.  Section 328(a) provides in part: 
 
  The trustee . . . with the court's 
approval, may employ or authorize the 
employment of a professional person . . . on 
any reasonable terms and conditions of 
employment . . . .  Notwithstanding such 
terms and conditions, the court may allow 
compensation different from the compensation 
provided under such terms and conditions 
after the conclusion of such employment, if 
such terms and conditions prove to have been 
improvident in light of developments not 
capable of being anticipated at the time of 
the fixing of such terms and conditions. 
  
 Bankruptcy courts should, as we noted in Busy Beaver, 
make a determination as early as possible regarding acceptable 
rates and the possible ceilings they will set on the 
professional's fees.  The failure to do so is not, however, 
reversible error in this case.  Zolfo Cooper's claim to money 
from the bankruptcy estate is limited to a claim for reasonable 
fees.  11 U.S.C § 330(a)(1).  The fee applicant has the burden of 
proving it has earned the fees it requests, and that the fees are 
reasonable.  In re Metro Transp., 107 B.R. at 53.  Accordingly, 
Zolfo Cooper cannot claim reliance on a particular amount of 
compensation, and the mere fact of delay in assessing Zolfo 
Cooper's fee request was not an error. 
 It is a separate question whether the bankruptcy court 
could, consistent with § 328(a), reach an independent 
determination of the fees to which Zolfo Cooper was entitled 
without a finding that the rates set out in Zolfo Cooper's 
retention affidavit were improvident.  In In re C & P Auto 
Transport, Inc., 94 B.R. 682, 685 n.4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988), 
the court observed the importance of the precise language of the 
order authorizing the professional's employment:  
 
 If the order does not expressly and 
unambiguously state specific terms and 
conditions (e.g. specific hourly rates or 
contingency fee arrangements) that are being 
approved pursuant to the first sentence of 
section 328(a), then the terms and conditions 
are merely those that apply in the absence of 
specific agreement.  That leaves the court 
free to apply lodestar rates unfettered by 
the strictures of the second sentence of 
section 328(a) . . . . 
  
We agree with this observation as it establishes a useful and 
appropriate presumption that prevents courts from being bound to 
specific terms unintentionally.  There is no reason why the 
burden should be on the court to specify in its order authorizing 
retention of the professional that it rejects specific terms and 
conditions.  Instead, the burden should rest on the applicant to 
ensure that the court notes explicitly the terms and conditions 
if the applicant expects them to be established at that early 
point.  Further, the bankruptcy court's duty to conduct an 
independent examination of fee applications for services 
rendered, Busy Beaver, 19 F.3d at 841, would be unduly restricted 
if employment authorization orders were routinely construed as 
binding the court to particular terms of employment. 
 In the present case, the bankruptcy court order 
authorizing Zolfo Cooper's retention stated that "debtors in 
possession[] be and hereby are authorized to retain the firm of 
[Zolfo, Cooper & Co.] to perform the services as set forth in the 
foregoing Motion and Affidavit of Frank John Zolfo."  In re 
Allegheny Int'l, Inc., No. 88-448 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1988) 
(order authorizing retention of Zolfo Cooper).  This language 
only established the nature and range of services.  It cannot 
bind the court to particular terms and conditions of 
compensation.  
 C. 
 Finally, Zolfo Cooper argues the bankruptcy court erred 
by not properly taking into account its supplemental applications 
for expenses, which it contends corrected any deficiencies in its 
  
prior applications for reimbursement.  Zolfo Cooper incurred 
these expenses before December 1, 1989.   
 The bankruptcy court refused to reimburse Zolfo Cooper 
for these expenses, explaining in its opinion of August 21, 1990, 
that they were insufficiently documented.  Zolfo Cooper contends 
it supplemented the documentation three times and requested the 
court review the supplemental documentation.  Zolfo Cooper argues 
the bankruptcy court improperly failed to acknowledge or comment 
upon the supplemental documentation. 
 When a bankruptcy court denies compensation to an 
applicant who has attempted to comply in good faith with 
specificity requirements of the bankruptcy rules, the court 
should allow time to supplement the application.  The court also 
"should notify the applicant of its particular reasons for 
denying the fees, and . . . allow the professional the occasion 
to defend his or her fee application with legal arguments and/or 
evidence (of market practices, etc.) at a hearing."  Busy Beaver, 
19 F.3d at 847. 
 In In re Four Star Terminals, Inc., 42 B.R. 419, 437-38 
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1984), the court denied expense requests that 
were improperly documented but stated the applicant could 
resubmit these expenses with proper documentation in a later 
application.  Our statements in Busy Beaver support this 
approach.  Absent a lack of good faith on the part of the 
applicant, a court should allow the applicant a chance to cure 
defects in its original expense documentation.  See Busy Beaver, 
19 F.3d at 846-47. 
  
 The bankruptcy court found Zolfo Cooper's initial 
application for expenses grossly inadequate, stating, "None of 
the expenses listed in the petitions are properly documented.  
The applicant has failed to submit itemized expenses. . . .  The 
applicant's attempt to bill the estate for large sums, without 
providing adequate details, is incredible."10  August 21, 1990, 
Opinion at 6.  The court nevertheless allowed significant 
portions of the expenses requested, including reimbursement for 
travel, photocopying, postage, and telecopying. 
                     
10
.  Zolfo Cooper complains this decision of the bankruptcy court 
was prompted by its December 14, 1989, Opinion in which it 
announced its intention to follow Bankruptcy Rule 2016(a) and 
Local Bankruptcy Rule 9016.1.  Zolfo Cooper suggests it was 
unfairly expected to comply with the December 14, 1989, order for 
expenses it had already incurred.  This argument fails for two 
reasons.  First, Rule 9016.1 of the Local Rules of the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(1989) provides in part:  
 
  Unless otherwise ordered, no 
compensation or expenses will be allowed to 
any professional for any service rendered in 
any case unless an application for fees and 
expenses is filed which provides the 
following. 
 
  . . . . 
 
  6. An itemization of the expenses for 
which reimbursement is requested. 
 
The bankruptcy court's December 14, 1989, Opinion was thus not 
necessary to put Zolfo Cooper on notice of what was required.  
Second, Zolfo Cooper had eight months after December 14, 1989, 
before the bankruptcy court ruled on its first fee applications.  
This period was clearly sufficient for Zolfo Cooper to supplement 
its application before the bankruptcy court ruled on its 
application. 
  
 The bankruptcy court denied expenses for meals, support 
staff, and direct expenses, holding they were improperly 
documented and that meals (to the extent they were local meals) 
and support staff expenses were overhead11 and not subject to 
reimbursement.  With respect to the direct expenses, the court 
stated it could not determine what they were, and therefore could 
not allow them. 
 The bankruptcy court continued in subsequent rulings to 
disallow these expenses without comment, prompting a letter from 
Zolfo Cooper's counsel dated August 30, 1991, which noted Zolfo 
Cooper had made "considerable efforts to clarify the 
documentation of its expenses," and requested the court clarify 
that it had examined the supporting documentation.  J. App. at 
916.  Zolfo Cooper stated it was raising the issue "of the Unpaid 
Expenses not to cause the Court to revisit a matter that has 
already been decided, but merely to confirm that it indeed has 
been decided . . . ."  Id. 
 The bankruptcy court responded "[t]he portion of the 
August 21, 1990 Opinion clearly states that the expenses which 
were not properly documented were disallowed.  The Court 
                     
11
.  We note that the bankruptcy court's ruling on this point is 
called into question by our holding in Busy Beaver that not all 
clerical services are necessarily overhead.  19 F.3d at 848.  
Generally, a bankruptcy court should seek to determine if 
nonbankruptcy professionals charge their clients for these 
particular services.  Id. at 849.  But an applicant must offer 
evidence that the market practice is otherwise.  Here, not only 
were these expenses improperly documented in the first instance, 
the bankruptcy court found they were never properly documented.  
Nor is there any indication that Zolfo Cooper presented evidence 
that these expenses are compensated in the nonbankruptcy context. 
  
continues to disallow the expenses on the basis that they were 
never properly documented as was required by the Court."  In re 
Allegheny Int'l, Inc., No. 88-448 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1991) 
("September 5, 1991, Order") (order clarifying denial of 
expenses).  Although this statement is rather terse, it came at 
the end of a long fee application process.  The bankruptcy court 
is obliged carefully to consider the documentation submitted by 
applicants for fees and expenses, but it is not required to 
provide elaborate findings after each request for 
reconsideration.  
 The bankruptcy court provided a thorough analysis of 
Zolfo Cooper's fee application in its August 21, 1990, Opinion, 
in which it granted most of Zolfo Cooper's requests even though 
it found "[n]one of the expenses listed in the petitions are 
properly documented."  August 21, 1990, Opinion at 6.  Its 
September 5, 1991, Order might have discussed more explicitly its 
consideration of the supplemental materials, but the context of 
the September 5, 1991, Order makes clear that the court 
considered the materials and found them wanting.  The bankruptcy 
court answered the question Zolfo Cooper asked--whether the court 
had reached a decision regarding fees.  This comports with the 
proper standard, which requires the court to consider 
supplemental materials where the initial application was in good 
faith.  Here, the bankruptcy court considered the supplemental 
materials even though language in its August 21, 1990, Opinion 
suggests Zolfo Cooper's original request might not have met the 
good faith standard.  We are satisfied that the bankruptcy court 
  
properly considered the supplemental documentation submitted by 
Zolfo Cooper.  The bankruptcy court made clear it considered the 
documentation insufficient, and we find no error here. 
 IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court. 
